Unlike traditional networks, the characteristics of mobile wireless devices that can dynamically form a network without any infrastructure and wired line mean that mobile ad hoc networks frequently display partition owing to node mobility or link failures. Consequently, an ad hoc network is difficult to provide on-line access to trusted authorities or centralized servers. Despite the existence of well-known security mechanisms, the absence of a stationary central authorization facility in an open and distributed communication environment is a major challenge. Consequently, applying traditional Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) security architecture to mobile ad hoc networks will create secure blind sides. Based on this perspective, this study proposes a novel scalable and robust cluster-organized key management scheme. Distribution of trust to an aggregation of cluster heads using a threshold scheme faculty provides mobile ad hoc networks with robust key management. Furthermore, the proposed approach provides Certificate Authority (CA) with a fault tolerance mechanism to prevent a single point of compromise or failure, and saves CA large repositories from maintaining member certificates, making the proposed approach more suitable for numerous mobile devices. Additionally, this study proposes a Cluster Secure Based Routing Protocol (CSBRP) to integrate into the key management to enhance non-repudiation of routing information and routing performances. Finally, this study introduces a mathematical model to demonstrate that the proposed cluster-based communication outperforms the node-based approach. key words: ad hoc networks, PKI, CA, CSBRP, node-based, clusterorganized 
Introduction
Ad hoc networks have no fixed infrastructure such as base stations or mobile switching centers, and the framework is dynamic owing to frequent changes in both topology and membership (such as nodes frequently join and leave the network). Consequently, the trust relationships among nodes also change, and many security solutions with static configurations will become inadequate. Besides, ad hoc networks have no fixed servers to coordinate mobile host activities. Each node serves as a router transmitting messages from one node to another, contacts nodes lying beyond transmission range passes through multiple hops to reach destinations, and routes dynamically owing to node movement. These nodes can be heterogeneous devices that are power and CPU constraints and have insecure wireless links. The nodes also must perform all other network functions. Owing to the above characteristics, ad hoc networks are vulnerable to attacks, such as eavesdropping, traffic anal- ysis, DoS attacks on routing, and so on. Intruders can successfully partition a network or introduce excessive traffic loads, and the nodes themselves may be compromised. However, it is difficult to detect intruders and compromised nodes since they can generate valid signatures, pretend to be normal nodes, or impersonate nodes. So far, numerous studies on secure networks have been conducted, including key management [24] , key distribution, and secure routing, and so on. However, the schemes from these studies are not suitable for ad hoc networks because they usually rely on a CA that is the most important component of PKI and vouches for the validity of digital certificates. That is to say that a principal must be able to correspond with the CA to obtain a certificate, check the status of and acquire certificates of other principals, and so on.
The PKI has been deployed for wired networks [3] , and some infrastructure-based wireless networks [9] , and thus good connectivity can be assumed in these networks meaning that the trustworthy research on such environments has focused on the security and capability of the CA for handling large numbers of requests [4] . However, ad hoc networks do not have good connectivity, and secure mobile ad hoc networks will become extremely impracticable if reliance on traditional cryptographic primitives continues.
Besides the CA and connectivity issues, any successful key management framework for ad hoc networks requires fault tolerance and security. The fault tolerance and security are sometimes used interchangeably, primarily because they are not independent of each other. To prevent confusion, this study clearly defines these items below and evaluates their effectiveness when applied to key management approaches: (1) Fault tolerance: The primary concern of fault tolerance is the capability of maintaining normal security operations given faulty nodes. If a node is collapsing and other nodes observe this fault, recovery is possible to a certain degree. This study employs intelligent replication using threshold cryptography to provide security tolerance of faulty nodes; (2) Security: The proposed framework should be secure against malicious nodes or adversaries. While it may not be possible to resist all types of attacks, there should be a threshold up until which attacks can be resisted.
Additionally, several proposals of key and certificates management in mobile ad hoc networks have been proposed. The proposals can be classified into following categories. They include (1) Partially distributed CA, (2) Fully distributed CA, (3) Partially distributed Private/Public
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Key Generator (PKG), and (4) Self-Organized PKI [3] , [26] . However, no secure routing mechanisms are integrated into the key and certificates managements. The entire mobile ad hoc networks should combine key management schemes with routing protocols since a routing protocol should prevent the impersonation, modification, DoS, and routing disruption security flaws (among many others) [14] , [16] . Briefly, all secure routing protocols must satisfy the following requirements to ensure accurate path discovery from source to destination given malicious adversaries: (1) Route signaling must be impossible to spoof; (2) Fabricated routing messages cannot be injected into the routing path; (3) Routing messages cannot be altered in transit, except for the normal functionality of the routing protocols [17] ; (4) Routing loops cannot be formed through malicious action; (5) Routes cannot be redirected from the shortest path by malicious action; (6) The receiver and sender of a routing message should not be able to subsequently deny receiving or sending that message [28] . These nonrepudiation requirements demand that the network or the messages cannot be modified by any authenticated user.
From the above it follows, that a wire-based security system is unsuitable for ad hoc networks, and that specific security schemes must adapt themselves to the characteristics of mobile ad hoc networks. This study proposes a novel cluster-organized key management scheme and integrates it into secure routing protocols. The proposed network framework is a two-layer hierarchical structure performing key generation, key distribution, and storage. The bottom layer is responsible for internal cluster domain authentication using ID-based scheme, and the upper layer, root CA, is responsible for external cluster domain authentication. The advantage of two-layer key management scheme is to distribute the central key management functionality to a number of CAs. Consequently, the distribution mechanism can reduce computing loads of central CA and key repositories. The internal cluster secure routing and the external cluster secure routing use the local cluster head as CA and the root cluster head as CA, respectively. This mechanism speeds internal routing efficiency and reduces external routing loads. Once an adversary penetrates the system, only a minority of CAs are ruined. The proposed scheme is very different from a traditional CA framework because central CA presents a single point of failure. Consequently, when the central CA is penetrated, the entire network is compromised. This study aims to provide a secure, scalable, and fault tolerance key management, and then applies this mechanism in secure routing protocols to ensure that the ad hoc networks are safe and reliable.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the proposed design of the key management scheme for ad hoc networks. Section 3 then describes the approach of cluster-organized key management, authority frameworks and authenticated routing processes. Subsequently, Sect. 4 presents the secure cluster head election algorithm. Meanwhile, Sect. 5 shows the simulation and analytical results for the proposed scheme. Finally, Sect. 6 suggests possible future research directions and conclusions.
CBKM (Cluster-Based Key Management)
Clustering is a resilient architecture. This architecture is designed to minimize the flooding of authority packets and promote the scalability of networks [1] . The entire network is divided into a number of disjointed two or above hopcount clusters with gateway nodes being responsible for the communication between each cluster pair. Actually, when the cluster extends its transit range for very large scale, it resembles the general ad hoc network infrastructure. The networks contain a central CA. This central CA suffers from having a single failure point and limited power constrained. Meanwhile, when the transit range approaches zero, the network implies that every node acts as a CA. That is, the selforganized mobile ad hoc networks [3] , [4] represent this special case.
The proposed key management is based on improved cluster infrastructure. However, this mechanism can solve the aforementioned issues and supply a stronger and more secure environment. The next few certificate authority schemes presented in this study attempt to intelligently distribute the certificate authority functionality among a number of nodes. Though this basic concept has been proposed earlier [12] , its application on cluster-organized key management of this study is novel. Under the proposed scheme, the encryption key is divided into n parties and distributed among n cluster heads. The key can only be reconstructed by acquiring k such pieces. This study will now assess some schemes based on the proposed technique, and achieves robust CA and improved security.
To achieve fault tolerance of security and perfect secrecy, a threshold scheme [5] is used. An (n, k) threshold cryptography scheme allows n parties to share the ability to perform a cryptographic operation [7] (such as creating a digital signature) so that any k parties can perform this operation jointly, whereas it is infeasible for a maximum of k − 1 parties to do so, even if they collude.
In the proposed model, the n cluster heads of the key management service share the ability to recuperate the system-secret-key S K. To ensure that the service can tolerate k − 1 compromised cluster heads, an (n, k) threshold cryptography scheme is employed and the S K of the service is divided into n shadows (secret sharing keys) (S h 1 , S h 2 , . . . , S h n ), and one share is assigned to each cluster head. Figure 1 illustrates an (n, 3) threshold cryptographic scheme. Each cluster head i has shadow sh i . Correct cluster heads 1, 3 and n submits their own shadow sh i to a root cluster head Rch (a dealer and combiner). Even if other cluster heads (Ch i ) fail to submit their shadows, Rch can generate the correct S K. However, compromised cluster heads (of which there are a maximum of two) cannot generate S K correctly, because they can generate a maximum of two partial shadows.
In a cluster, a node with high level of security and stability goes through the secure cluster head election algo- rithm (will be described in section 4) to be elected as a cluster head; and further, the cluster head must maintain the secure operations, cluster formation, and cluster membership information (such as the MAC, IP, and so on).
Based on the foregoing viewpoints, this study proposes the two-layer cluster-based architecture for key management. This flexible hierarchical authentication scheme is optimal for numerous nodes and consists of three types of entities:
A. Root cluster head (Rch): The root cluster head is the parent CA. The Rch is responsible for dealing system key pair (PK, S K) and combining the partial key into a valid one, and serves as the communication trust center for the external cluster domains. B. Cluster head (Ch): The cluster head is the child CA. The Ch is responsible for administrative authority, initializing its own cluster domain, storing certificates in the repository, and generating related keys in response to the requests of a normal node. C. Normal node: A client node in a cluster domain, which queries a cluster head for certificates.
Briefly, the Rch is the role of the parent CA and the Ch is that of the child CA. Rch is the same as the root CA in PKI. The Ch and Rch are generated based on the election algorithm described in section 4. The key management hierarchical model is shown in Fig. 2 , and the management scheme is as follows:
A. First step: Rch generates a key pair (PK, S K) using public key cryptography. S K is the system-secret-key, and is used to generate the public key certificates of cluster heads.
Meanwhile, PK is the system-public-key, which verifies the authenticity of public key certificates of the cluster heads. PK is distributed to every cluster head in the system, and S K is protected by the secret sharing scheme. B. Second step: The cluster head i (i = 1, 2, 3, . . . , n) generates a key pair (Pchi, S chi), and then sends the public key Pchi to Rch. When Rch receives Pchi, it generates a Pchi certificate Cert (Pchi) using the system-secret-key S K, and then returns Cert (Pchi) to cluster head i. Once cluster head i receives this certificate Cert (Pchi), the Cert (Pchi) is verified by cluster head i using PK to ensure this certificate comes from the correct Rch. C. Third step: Following Rch generates n certificates for n cluster heads, Rch divides S K into n shadows (secret sharing keys) (S h 1 , S h 2 , . . . , S h n ) using the method of secret sharing, encrypts S h i with the public key Pchi of cluster head i, and then sends S h i encrypted to cluster head i, for each i = 1, 2, 3, . . . n. As soon as Rch knows that each cluster head has received its correct public key certificate and S h i , Rch discards the system-secret-key S K to improve system security. Therefore, if Rch is captured by the adversaries then the system is safe.
The above steps represent the initial phases of the proposed system. Since cluster heads or normal nodes may join or leave the system, a root cluster head may be cracked or replaced. The proposed key management scheme will describe how the key management deals with the case where a normal node joins or leaves a cluster domain, or when a cluster head collapses unexpectedly.
CBKM Authority Framework

CBKM Internal Authority Framework
To enhance routing and communication performance, an IDbased scheme is introduced in every cluster domain. The advantage of the ID-based system over the public key system is that the public key in ID-based system is implicitly certified from an identity. Consequently, cluster heads can only maintain IDs of members (such as the MAC or IP address, and so on). The system no longer needs to store and distribute public keys. This ID-based system has the potential to minimize space requirements and communication loads. Similarly, ID-based secret key mechanisms avoid the need to use a cluster head to maintain a large database containing the secret keys. This scheme has the further advantage of providing increased security [13] , and excellent communication performance in every internal cluster domain. In the bottom layer, as shown in Fig. 2 , the cluster head serves as the PKG for cluster members. When a node joins the network, it is given a master-public-key belonging to a cluster domain. Furthermore, each node also applies for a personalprivate-key from its cluster domain head, and uses it to achieve routing packets and messages encrypted/decrypted capability. 
Initial Phase
During the initial phase, every cluster domain member elects cluster head Ch as the domain CA in Fig. 3 via an election algorithm. The CA issues related keys according to the client nodes that are applied for. To ensure secure issuing of related keys, the CA and the client node generate a session key between them using the Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol [30] , [31] , and then use this session key to protect (encrypt) the issued keys applied for by client nodes.
Joining/Leaving Domain Phase
Since each node periodically broadcasts a list of all of its neighbors which it can reach within one hop (without flooding) using a simple hello message. This message contains information regarding the neighbors, including the clusters the belonged to, adjacent clusters, Certificate Revocation List (CRL), and so on. Upon receiving a hello message, a node updates its local related tables with the hello message information, and thus can detect the joining or leaving nodes. This method provides a useful means of maintaining cluster membership synchronization.
When a node joins the cluster domain for the first time, the cluster head detects that a new node has joined by hello messages. The system begins cluster head election algorithm for the remaining nodes which have not yet been chosen as a cluster head or assigned to a cluster domain. When a node leaves an old cluster for a new cluster domain, the new cluster head treats it as a new node joining its cluster domain. Once the old cluster head receives newer hello messages from its one-hop neighbors, the messages do not have the member entities of the leaving node for a certain predefined time interval. The old cluster head purges the member entity of this node.
Internal Cluster Members Communication
When node Mha wants to communicate with node Mhb, as shown in Fig. 4 , cryptographic schemes are employed to protect both data traffic and routing information. The key mechanism employed here is the ID-based encryption scheme. The en/decryption scheme of this study comprises of four algorithms as follows:
Setup: Ch takes a security parameter as input and outputs a cluster domain master-public/secret-key. The master- public-key is publicly known, while only the Ch (PKG) knows the master-secret-key. Extract: Ch takes the master-secret-key and Mh ID (an arbitrary string) as inputs, and returns the personal-privatekey S ID corresponding to the Mh ID. Encrypt: The sender uses the master-public-key, the Mh ID of the receiver, and a plain message as inputs, and outputs a corresponding ciphertext. Decrypt: The receiver takes the master-public-key, a personal-private-key S ID , and a ciphertext as inputs, and then outputs the corresponding plain message.
This algorithm setup is performed by Ch (PKG). The
Ch also performs the algorithm to extract the request of a node that wishes to obtain its personal-private-key.
When Mh i applies for a personal-private-key from Ch, Ch calculates the personal-private-key of Mh i , and denotes S IDi as follows:
, where H k ( ) is a keyed one-way function under the master-secret-key k. Examples of keyed one-way functions include MD5, SHA [19] and HMAC [20] . The resulting key S IDi is called the personalprivate-key of entity Mh i , and argument h i indicates that it is optional.
During the setup phase, cluster head Ch plays the PKG role and generates the master-public/secret-keys for the cluster domain system. Thus Mh a communicates with Mh b and obtains the personal-private-key from Ch. Ch takes the master-secret-key and the identity of Mh a (such as the MAC, IP, and so on) as inputs, and returns to Mh a personalprivate-key S IDa as shown in Fig. 5 . Following that, Mh a takes the master-public-key, the identity of the recipient Mh b , and the plain message as inputs, and then sends a ciphertext to Mh b . Once Mh b receives this ciphertext, it takes the master-public-key, the ciphertext, and its own personalprivate-key as inputs, and then returns the plain message.
To ward off malicious node routing attacks, this study uses node ID and personal-private-key as the key pair and adopts CKM [2] cryptographic certificates to offer routing security to internal cluster member. The CKM consists of a preliminary certification process followed by a routing process that guarantees end-to-end routing authentication. Once the internal secure routing path is established, the source node applies the proposed scheme to the message en/decryption.
CBKM External Authority Framework
When Mh a and Mh b are located in different cluster domains, external authority architecture is introduced.
Initial Phase
In a secret sharing design, the system key pair is denoted as (PK, S K), where PK represents the system-public-key, S K is the system-secret-key, and Rch generates the (PK, S K). Once a cluster head passes through the gateway node to join/leave the system, the Rch regenerates a new system key pair (PK, S K) according to the scenario described in Sect. 2. The newer PK is well know to all cluster heads (Chs), and S K is divided into n shadows (secret sharing keys) (S h 1 , S h 2 , . . . , S h n ) by the secret sharing approach. S h i is encrypted using the public key Pchi of cluster head i, after which Rch sends an encrypted version of S h i to cluster head i, and the receiver cluster head i decrypts the encrypted S h i using S chi. In the proposed approach, S K is shared by an arbitrary large community using a secret polynomial f (x). If the degree of f (x) is k − 1, then any k community members (cluster heads) can reconstruct the secret key using Lagrange Interpolation, while any numbers of cluster heads less than k reveal no information regarding the S K. In the scenario considered here, RCh generates the secret key S K = S d and randomly chooses a polynomial f (x) of degree
are less than random prime p, and the shared secret is
With any construction of k cluster heads (Ch 1 , Ch 2 , Ch 3 . . . , Ch k ), this study derivates that
is the Lagrange Coefficients, each share holder Ch i can calculate an S K i from its shadow S h i via Lagrange Interpolation, and then the S K (=S d ) is reconstructed from the sum
The polynomial secret sharing system should be protected against attack because adversaries could break into k or more cluster heads in enough attack time. The system has to refresh periodic secret sharing updates with different polynomials using a proactive secret sharing mechanism [18] . This study constructs another polynomial f k+1 from f k , f k+1 = f k + g k , where g k is a random degree (k − 1) polynomial, and the new secret share f k+1 ( 
If the shadow of a cluster head expired or compromised, the head is considered a suspect. The system will store the shadow and the head in its CRL using a suspect accusation factor and forward the accusation to other cluster heads, which store it in their revocation list with a suspect accusation and decrease the secure weight. The suspect is convicted when a cluster head Ch acquires k accusations. Based on this model, this study provides robust RCh fault tolerance. Once the RCh collapses or any k cluster heads convict it of malicious behaviors, the cluster head election algorithm elects a new RCh and then cooperates with other cluster heads to reconstruct the system-secret-key S K from the k shadows (S h 1 , S h 2 , . . . , S h n ), after which it regains normality.
Communication Phase
When Mh a and Mh b are located in different cluster domains, they wish to communicate with each other as shown in Fig. 6 . This communication is accompanied with cryptographic certificates to ensure routing security. This study proposes the Cluster Secure Based Routing Protocol (CSBRP), which integrates Cluster-Based Routing Protocol (CBRP) [21] with authenticity, integrity, and nonrepudiation. The CSBRP is accomplished by a Cluster Secure Route Request (CSRREQ) message from a source cluster head Ch s that is sent in reply to a Cluster Secure Route Reply Packet (CSRREP) message by the destination cluster head Ch x . The CSRREQ and CSRREP messages are resemble the Route Request (RREQ) and Route Reply (RREP) messages in on demand ad hoc routing protocols such as AODV [23] , [29] and DSR [10] , [15] . Routing information is also managed similar to these protocols. A reverse path to the sender is established as a CSRREQ packet passes through a head. These reverse paths are coupled with timers, and are maintained for long enough for a returning CSRREP packet to return to the sender. If no CSRREP is returned within the time-out period, the reverse path entry in the routing table expires and is purged. Such routing messages are authenticated at each cluster head between the source and destination, and on the reverse path from the destination to the source. CSBRP requires RCh to be used as a certificate server whose system-public-key (PK) is known to all cluster heads. Once a cluster head collapses, the new cluster head can reapply a new public key certificate from Rch that gathers k shadows for reconstructing the system-secret-key (S K) and generates the public key certificate of this cluster head and then discard the S K. The RCh need not store the repositories of the public key certificates of all cluster heads. The scenario considered here introduces a cluster-to-cluster authentication mechanism and the cluster head verifies the routing factuality. The authentication processes is detailed below.
The routing packets are protected by an RSA scheme because such a scheme can achieve en/decryption and signature. A source cluster head Ch s in the initial phase has obtained its certificate Cert (Pchi) from Rch, and Cert (Pchi) is simplified as Cert chi . Moreover, Ch s identifies routes to destination Ch x by broadcasting CSR-REQ packets to the neighbor cluster heads of Ch s . This study adopts the bold expression to present a detailed secure routing procedure "Ch s → Broadcast: Cert Chs , X s = Ek S chs [T, PT csrreq , IP Chx , S eq Chs , E]," which means that Ch s broadcasts a CSRREQ packet, which includes the certificate of Ch s and a packet signed using the private key S chs of Ch s . On receiving the CSRREQ, the destination Ch x unicasts a CSRREP packet back along the reverse routing path to the source cluster head. This study adopts the expression "
," which means Ch x unicasts the CSRREP packet back to the reverse path cluster head Ch c . Furthermore, the operator "→" indicates the operation of broadcasting routing packets to neighbor cluster heads or unicasting routing packets back to the reserve path cluster head depending on following object.
The CSRREQ and CSRREP packet formats include Cert Chi , X i (R i ), T, PT csrreq(csrrep) , IP Chi , S eq Chi , E , where: (1) Cert Chi indicates the certificate of Ch i ; (2) X i (R i ) represents the digital signature result of Ch i ; (3) T is the timestamp of when the packet was created; (4) PT csrreq (csrrep) represents the packet type; (5) IP Chi is the IP address of the destination (or source) cluster head; (6) S eq Chi is a globally unique sequence number generated by Ch i ; and (7) E denotes the packet expired time (TTL). Table 1 Fig. 6 . The detailed secure routing procedure is described as follows:
When a cluster head receives a CSRREQ packet, it establishes a reverse path back to the source by recording the neighbor cluster head from which it receives the CSRREQ. This process is done in anticipation of eventually receiving a reply message that will need to be forward back to the source cluster head. The receiving node uses the public key of Ch s , which it extracts from the certificate Cert chs of Ch s to validate the correctness of the signature in Cert chs . Furthermore, this public key can be used to verify that the CSRREQ packet has not been tampered with. The receiving cluster head also checks the (S eq chs , IP chx ) tuple to verify that the CSRREQ packet has not already been processed. If the attackers have no cluster head's Schi, the signature can prevent spoofing attacks that may alter the route message. Finally, let Ch a denote a neighbor cluster head that has been received from Ch s the CSRREQ broadcast, which it subsequently rebroadcasts.
Upon receiving the CSRREQ, Ch b , the neighboring cluster head of Ch a validates the signature using the given certificate Cert cha . Ch b then decrypts X a using the public of Ch a (extracted from Cert cha ), discards the certificate of Ch a , verifies this packet, and records Ch a as its predecessor. Subsequently, Ch b uses its own private key Schb to encrypt the contents of the CSRREQ packet originally broadcasted from Ch s , appends its own certificate Cert chb , and then forward rebroadcasts the CSRREQ packet to neighboring cluster heads.
Each cluster head along the path repeats this process of validating the public key certificate of the previous node, decrypting the routing packet, discarding the certificate of the previous node, recording the IP of the previous cluster head, encrypting the original contents of the routing messages, appending its own certificate, and forward broadcasting the routing message. After receiving the CSRREQ packet, the Ch x validates the correctness of Cert Chs and X s . Since many loose source routing paths are known to pass through distinct cluster heads, the Ch x determines the strict source routing path based on hop counts. The destination Ch x unicasts a CSRREP packet back along the reverse strict source routing path to the source cluster head Ch s . The first node that receives the CSRREP packet sent by Ch x is denoted as the cluster head Ch c .
The CSRREP packet is signed with S chx, the private key of Ch x . Each cluster head along the reverse strict source routing path unicasts back to the predecessor, encrypts the CSRREP packet, and appends its own certificate before forwarding the CSRREP packet to the next cluster head. Moreover, let Ch b denotes the next cluster head that receives the CSRREP packet of Ch c .
Ch b validates the public key certificate of Ch c on the received routing message, discards the certificate Cert chc , and then decrypts the contents of the packet R c and appends its own certificate Cert chb , after encrypting Cert chx and R x with its own private key S chb and unicasting the CSRREP packet to Ch a .
Each head along this strict routing path checks the CSRREP packet, validates the public key certificate of the previous cluster head, then decrypts the encrypted CSRREP packet sent from the previous head, and encrypts Cert chx and R x using its own private key, as the CSRREP packet returns back to the source. This approach avoids attacks in which malicious nodes instantiate routes by impersonation and replay the message of Ch x . When the source cluster head Ch s receives the CSRREP packet, it verifies the public key certificate Cert chx returned by the destination.
Once cluster heads uses the secure routing mission to determine the strict source routing path, the source cluster head Ch s begins to convey encrypted messages according to the public key of next head. The receiver cluster head then decrypts the cipher message and verifies the messages using its own private key to ensure no tampering with the messages.
Secure Cluster Head Election
In the proposed architecture, cluster heads are responsible for cluster formation and maintain the network security. When the cluster head discloses confidential information, it will endanger the security of the system. Additionally, due to the dynamic nature of the mobile nodes, their association and dissociation to and from clusters perturb network stability and thus reconfiguration of cluster heads is essential. Choosing cluster heads optimally is an NP-hard problem [27] . Hence, existing solutions to this problem are based on heuristic (mostly greedy) approaches and never attempt to retain the network security and stability topology. This study believes that a good clustering scheme should provide strict system security. Additionally, system structure should be preserved as much as possible in the face of node movement and topological change. Otherwise, re-election of cluster heads and frequent information exchange among the participating nodes will cause high computation load and overheads.
The cluster head also plays such an important role. To determine the suitability of a node for being a cluster head, this study proposes security measure to insure trustworthiness of heads, and uses the weight-based algorithm to elect stable cluster heads. This study considers several system parameters, including the ideal node degree, transmission power, mobility and node battery power. Depending on specific applications, any or all of these parameters can be used in the metric to select the cluster heads. Furthermore, the security makes a great impact on election. When nodes become "convicted" they are eliminated from the election regardless of their stability. The election flowchart is shown in Fig. 7 , and the detailed procedure is presented below:
Step1. Compute the level of convicted accusation. Each node stores the accusation of insecure nodes in its Certificate Revocation List (CRL), and then forwards the information of accusations to neighbors who store it in their CRL with a "suspect" accusation. The level of convicted accusation is S v (0 S v k). Once the node gathers k accusations of a certain node, the "suspect" becomes "convicted." The k is the value in an (n, k) threshold cryptography scheme. The greater S v indicates more insecure.
Step2. Estimate the convicted accusation S v . If the S v of the node v equals k, then node v is a malicious node. Consequently, the node v is eliminated from the election. Otherwise, the following procedures are implemented. [8] to evaluate direct trust relationships between two nodes. The combined value is calculated as 
Step3. Value the trustworthy degree of node v. This study introduces the function of trust valuation in open networks
where V i, j denotes the value of the derivation of multiple direct trust relationships (such as passing through third party entities or recommendatory trust paths) between two nodes; V com represents the combined value of direct trust relationships in which i trusts j, as illustrated in Fig. 8 . In the proposed scheme, after a period of operations, since each node has the accused record of other nodes in its own CRL, the accused record (corresponding to an accused value between zero and one) indicates the trust value between two nodes and is shared among all nodes via hello messages, enabling the direct or recommended trust value to be derived. Consequently, the combined value V com between two nodes can be identified. Furthermore, T v = v ∈V,v v V com denotes the trustworthy degree meaning that the degree of trust of others nodes in node v.
Step4. Find the neighbors of each node v (that is nodes within its transmission range) which define its degree dv as
Step5. Compute the degree-difference ∆ v = |d v − δ|, for every node v. To ensure efficient Medium Access Control (MAC) functioning, each cluster head can support an optimum of δ (a pre-defined threshold) nodes. This optimum exists to ensure that a cluster head does not become overloaded and the system efficiency is maintained at the expected level.
Step6. For every node v, compute the sum of distances D v with all neighbors, as
Step7. Compute the running average speed for every node until the current time is T . Nodes are assumed to have a Global Positioning System (GPS) since the GPS is primarily used to determine the geographical location of nodes. This technique can be used to measure mobility and is denoted by M v , as
where (X t , Y t ) and (X t−1 , Y t−1 ) denote the coordinates of the node v at times t and time (t − 1), respectively.
Step8. Compute the cumulative time P v , during which a node v acts as a cluster head. P v indicates battery power consumption, which is assumed to be more for a cluster head than an ordinary node.
Step9. Calculate the combined weight W v for each node v in cluster
where w 1 , w 2 , w 3 and w 4 denote the weighted factors of the corresponding system parameters.
Step10. Choose the node with the smallest W v as the cluster head. All the neighbors of the chosen cluster head are no longer permitted to participate in the election procedure.
Step11. In the other clusters, repeat steps 1-10 to elect cluster heads for the remaining nodes not yet selected as a cluster head or assigned to a cluster.
Step12. Choose the cluster head with the smallest W v as the root cluster head Rch.
This first component S v T v , that contributes to the combined metric W v helps in measuring degree of secure. This component has high priority in the proposed procedure. Nodes that are not sufficiently secure fail to become cluster heads. The second component w 1 ∆ v helps ensure efficient MAC functioning because it is always desirable for there to be a limit on the number of nodes handled by a cluster head within a single cluster. The motivation of D v is primarily related to energy consumption. It is known that more power is required to communicate over larger distances. The fourth component for W v indicates node mobility. Less mobile nodes are always better choices for a cluster head. The final component P v is measured as the total (cumulative) time a node serves as a cluster head.
Evaluation
This section provides a security analysis of the proposed method of secure routing by evaluating its robustness to the attacks introduced in section 1, and analyzes the cluster CA model. Subsequently, this study evaluates and simulates the performance of the proposed model.
Security Analysis
Unauthorized participation and fault tolerant CAs: In the proposed model, participants accept only packets that have been signed with a certified key issued by the cluster head (CA). In practice, numerous mechanisms exist for authenticating users to a trusted CA. The trusted CA has a single point of failure and attack; however, the proposed threshold mechanism provides reliable and fault tolerant CAs. Even if several CAs collapse, other secure CAs can maintain the threshold cryptography functionality. Consequently, the whole system can continue normal operation. Spoofed routing signatures: Since only the source node can sign routing messages with its own private key, nodes cannot spoof other nodes in routing instantiations. Similarly, reply packets include the certificate and signature of the destination node, thus ensuring that only the destination can respond to route discovery. This prevents impersonation attacks in which either the source or destination nodes are spoofed. Forged routing messages: Only nodes with certificates can forge messages. CBKM thus does not prevent the fakery of routing messages, but does provide an intimidation by ensuring non-repudiation. If a malicious node continues to inject forged information into the network, it will be detected in future route processes. Alteration of routing messages: CBKM specifies that all fields of CSRREQ and CSRREP packets remain unchanged between the source and destination. Since both packet types are signed by the initiating node, any alterations in transit would immediately be detected by intermediary nodes along the path, and the altered packet would subsequently be discarded. Repeated instances of altering packets could cause other nodes to exclude the errant node from routing. Modification attacks thus are prevented. Routing loop attacks: CBKM enforces the maximum routing length (expired time E) and specifies that all fields of CSRREQ and CSRREP packets remain unchanged between the source and destination. This mechanism can prevent an attacker from inserting routing loops. An attacker can not modify the routing length in CSRREQ and CSRREP packets. Even if an attacker injects extra routing packets, it has limited attack power. Particularly, if the routing length is limited to n hops, then each packet transmitted by the attacker only causes a certain number of additional transmissions. Reply attacks: Replay attacks are prevented by including a timestamp and a sequence number with routing messages.
Model Analysis
This study presents a model using mathematical manners to demonstrate that the proposed cluster head CA structure is more flexible than either the central CA or the distributed CAs. All nodes are assumed here to be uniformly allocated on a square A. For simplicity, the following terms are defined. From the above definitions, the study can derive the following results:
1. The number of nodes in each row (column) equals to
The distance of two adjacent nodes in each row (column) is
3. λ satisfies the inequality
Following, the √ M can be classified into two cases: 
Here, an instance, as shown in Fig. 9(a) , is used to describe how to allocate CAs in this model for the first case (i), indicating that the equation 
Under the second case (ii), a positive integer j exists, such that 1 + 2( j − 1)λ < √ M < 1 + 2 jλ, as shown in Fig. 9(b) . If the number of nodes in each row (column) is 1 + 2 jλ (regarding A 1 as the corresponding square), then the #(CA) A1 = ( j + 1) 2 + j 2 = 2 j 2 + 2 j + 1. If the number of nodes in each row (column) is 1 + 2( j − 1)λ (regarding Fig. 9 The possible numbers of CAs, where the thick point denotes a CA, the intersectional point represents a mobile host, and the dotted diamond is the service range of CA.
A 2 as the corresponding square), then the #(CA) A2 = ( j − 1 + 1) 2 + ( j − 1) 2 = 2 j 2 − 2 j + 1. Therefore, the #(CA) A between (2 j 2 − 2 j + 1) and (2 j 2 + 2 j + 1). Based on the above derivations, this study gives the following results.
1. M CAs: If λ=0, then #(CA) A = M, since every node on A is a CA, as shown in Fig. 9(c) . This finding implies that every node is the cluster head that plays the role of a CA, and the self-organized key management framework [3] is a special case. 2. Numerous CAs: Fig. 9(a) . Fig. 9(b) . Figure 9 (b) displays the case #(CA) A2 #(CA) A #(CA) A1 , i.e., 5 #(CA) A 13. The cases (i) and (ii) imply that the system contains numerous cluster heads, each playing the role of the CA that is responsible for its own a service dominating set. The MOCA [6] framework is a special case.
, then #(CA) A =1, as shown in 9(d). This result implies a generally central CA architecture.
Performance Evaluation and Simulation
For the performance evaluation, the following assumptions are made regarding the protocol design:
1. All links are bi-directional. 2. Each node except for the gateway nodes belongs to a cluster, either as a member or cluster head. 3. Each node knows its neighbors, and each cluster member knows its cluster head. The cluster formation algorithm has already been done. 4. Each cluster head knows all of its members, but cluster members maybe do not necessarily know each other, except for neighbors. 5. The cluster head is as powerful as its members in terms of CPU power, memory capacity, and battery life, and so on. 6. Each node periodically advertises its presence via hello messages. This message contains information regarding the neighbors, adjacent clusters, and certificate repositories. 7. Each cluster member sends information learned from its neighbors to the cluster head to which it belongs. Nodes that have not joined clusters do not participate in the secure routing protocol. 8. All nodes are free of bandwidth, power, and CPU constraints. The physical control of the wireless links is secure. 9. Key re-assignment will not disrupt the communication between nodes.
This study analyzes four important elements: (1) Communication cost evaluation; (2) Security computing evaluation of the routing path establishment; (3) Successful ratio of reconstruction of S K; (4) Secure cluster head evaluation; 
Communication Cost Evaluation
The communication cost of ad hoc networks is an immensely complex problem [27] . The main complicity arises when attempting to consider irregular geographical distribution and any sources of interference (such as maintaining clusters, bandwidth, CPU, memory, network traffic, and so on). This study adopts hop counts to evaluate communication costs, because this is the most widely used measure. In the proposed cluster-based models, it is logical to assume that ad hoc networks have m × n mobile nodes and are located on a two-D coordinate. These mobile nodes are allocated on the intersections as shown in Fig. 10 . This study attempts to compute the min-hop-count for any two nodes in the proposed model, for simplicity the following terms are defined. Generally, V represents the sum of Min hop between two nodes, which is parallel to the Y-axis. Meanwhile, H represents the sum of Min hop between two nodes, which is parallel to the X-axis. Furthermore, B ab represents the number of grids a×b in an m×n model. Finally, R is the Min hop sum of all diagonal line pair-nodes belonging to a grid a × b. From the aforementioned terminologies, the following equations are established:
From Eqs. (1)- (4), The AV Min hop is determined to be (m + n)/3 as follows:
Applying Eq. (5), the cluster distribution model determined and the AVCBMin hop can be calculated for any two clusters. The cluster model is assumed to be denoted as an a × b model, and moreover to satisfy three conditions:
1. Each cluster domain has the same number. 2. Every cluster domain has a • b nodes; these nodes lie on a×b grid, and every intersection is only allocated a node. 3. The gateways between two clusters are located on the boundary lines.
For clarity, an example is presented for explanatory purposes. Let the ad hoc networks be represented by a 7 × 5 model, while the cluster domain is a 4 × 2 model, each cluster allocates eight nodes, and the double bold lines represent one cluster domain as shown in Fig. 11 . The above model shows that the system is divided into eight cluster domains. This study realizes that cluster Ch 1 comprises of node set = {N i j | i = 1, 2, 3, 4. j = 1, 2}, and each cluster Ch i (i = 1, 2, 3 . . . , 8) has eight nodes. The gateway nodes between clusters Ch 1 and Ch 3 are the node set={N 12 , N 22 , N 32 , N 42 ), which indicates the boundary between two rectangles. In an m × n network model with an = 17.333, and the average minimum cluster-hop-count for any two clusters AVCBMin hop is
The ratio of the communication cost between any two cluster heads and any two nodes is 
where a, b 1. Generally, Eq. (6) is lower than 1. This calculation result implies that the cluster-based average minimum cluster-hop-count is below the normal-based minimum node-hop-count. That is, the cluster-based model outperforms the normal node-based model. Considering the additional communication costs of node-based AV Min hop and cluster-based AVCBMin hop , the node-based communication costs of two neighboring nodes are assumed to be λ, in which case the costs of cluster-based two neighbor clusters will be ω•λ. The ω denotes the nodes passing through between two neighbor clusters, which generally is 1 ω Max(a, b) . Since two clusters could pass through a gateway node or even multiple nodes when communicating with each other, the ω depends on the position of the cluster head and the cluster topology. Equation (6) then is generalized to be equivalent to
If a ≥ b ≥ 2, then regardless of the values of m and n
.
Furthermore, where m, n 1 (a, b 2), Eq. (7) is
(1) When m = n 1. Equation (8) shows that the cluster-based approach outperforms the normal node-based one, at least in situations where the proposed model achieves better communication costs.
The Security Computing Evaluation of Routing Path Establishment
In the CBKM protocol, an RSA public key cryptosystem is applied to ensure routing security. Presently, the length of modular N = p × q is 1024 bits for security and the length of the encrypting (or verifying) key e (e = 2 16 + 1) is 16 bits. Based on the average result of encryption/decryption time in paper [22] , an RSA encryption (or verification) requires 1.5 × 16 (1024 + 34) = 25K clock cycles, and an RSA decryption (or signature) requires at least 1.5 × (1024 − 16) × (1024+34) = 1.6M clock cycles. For example, if the CPU is 50 MHz CPU, the RSA encrypting time and decrypting time must be 0.5 ms and 32.5 ms, respectively. Since encrypting and decrypting time differ significantly, the evaluation can ignore the encryption time of public key e. This study now considers a T MHz CPU, with the m × n network model, and the a × b cluster model, where modular N = p × q has length N bits. The delay time for computing routing security in the cluster-based model then is
while in the node-based model it is
Moreover, the ratio of cluster-based to node-based model delay time for computing routing security then is
Figures 12-14 detail the RSA encrypting/decrypting times in the cluster-based model during routing path establishment. 
Success Ratio in Reconstructing SK
In the proposed framework, k cluster heads provide CAs functionality for the whole network. Using threshold cryptography, these k cluster heads share the S K of the root cluster head, and any set of k cluster heads can be used to reconstruct the full S K. In reconstructing of S K, the root (source) cluster head must identify k cluster heads. A CSR-REQ is flooded using a cluster-based routing protocol to determine the routing path. While effective, this flooding approach generates significant traffic. To reduce overheads from flooding, the unicast-based approach is introduced. On receiving the CSRREQ, the destination cluster head unicasts a CSRREP packet back along the reverse routing path to the root (source) cluster head. For the unicast-based approach, every CSRREQ that receives k or more CSRREPs is counted as a successful S K request and the successful ratio is defined as:
Num o f success f ul system secret key(S K) request Number o f total system secret key(S K) request .
This study exploits a Network Simulator (NS-2) [25] to evaluate the success ratio of reconstructing the SK, and assumes that there are 100 nodes allocated in a 1500 m × 1500 m area of an indoor environment. Table 2 lists the simulation parameters, with the exception of mobility. Given the same number of CSRREQ requests, this study simulates four cases involving different numbers of clusters (1, 10, 20, 25) , with the same number of internal nodes. Figure 15 illustrates the ratio of successfully received k CSRREPs for various CAs. Almost all CSRREQs reach k cluster heads, and most CSRREPs eventually return to the source head. Some CSRREPs become lost due to temporary network contention resulting from the reverse packet storming effect from multiple CSRREPs returning to the client simultaneously. Figure 15 shows that given 10 CSRREQ requests, with increasing threshold value k, this study demonstrates that the value of CA = 25 or CA = 10 for k can produce a higher success ratio than CA = 1. The cluster framework is still more efficient than the normal node-based structure. 
Evaluation of Secure Cluster Head Election
Optimizing cluster head selection is an NP-hard problem [27] . Hence, existing solutions to this problem are based on heuristic (mostly greedy) approaches and do not attempt to retain the network security and stability topology. This study primarily proposes the secure cluster head election, with the aim of enhancing cluster head security during the election phase. Concerning the election time of choosing cluster heads in the proposed scheme (in Sect. 4), since step 3 involves calculating the trustworthy degree T v for each node, time is required for conducting this calculation. Especially, in the worst case scenario, this must calculate C n 2 connections, in which n is the total number of nodes and a connection can exist between any two nodes. However, in most cases, the connection depends on the reachable routing path between each other not on C n 2 connections, implying that the trustworthy degree T v of each node can be implemented based on the routing information. The only other required steps are simple mathematical operations for example addition, subtraction, multiplication, division, radical, and exponent involving on the received data. Consequently, the combined weight W v can easily be computed. Furthermore, given a reasonable number of cluster members, as well as a stable network topology during the election phase (no joining/leaving nodes), then the proposed cluster head election scheme should converge reasonably quickly. This study uses the NS-2 to evaluate the convergence time of cluster head election, and assumes that the nodes are allocated in a 1500 m × 1500 m area of an indoor environment. The simulation parameters are listed in Table 2 except for mobility. No joining/leaving nodes occur during the election phase. The simulation increases the number of cluster members from 1 to 20 in a step-by-step fashion, and is accompanied by the implementation of an election scheme. Figure 16 shows that work reveals that the election convergent time increases with the number of cluster members.
Network Performance
The evaluations were performed using the NS-2 with a wire- less extension. The aim was to demonstrate the reconstructive time involved in acquiring S K, packet delivery ratio, and routing overhead. To evaluate how CSBRP scales to larger networks, this study compares CSBRP with other ad hoc routing protocols. The simulation models were as follows:
Mobility Model: Nodes move within a fixed rectangular area 1500 m × 1500 m, and initially are positioned randomly. Node mobility is simulated based on the random waypoint mobility model, where each node moves toward a randomly selected location at a speed uniformly distributed between 0 and max speed, and then pauses for a configured time, before selecting another random location and repeating the process. Traffic Model: CSBRP is simulated using a 1024 bit key and a 16 bits encrypting (verifying) key. These values are adequate for preventing compromise during the short time that nodes spent away from the certificate authority and in the ad hoc networks. Packets with a fixed size of 128 bytes are sent at a constant sending rate of 4 pkts/sec. Table 2 lists the simulation parameters.
Host mobile pause time has values of (0, 30 s, 60 s, 120 s, 300 s, 600 s), with 0 representing constant mobility and 600s indicating a stationary network. In a simulated network of nodes (25, 50, 75 , 100, 150), simulations are for constant node speeds of (0 m/s, 5 m/s, 10 m/s, 15 m/s, 20 m/s), using the above pause time, and where every node has active CSBRP sessions.
To compare the performance of CSBRP, AODV, and DSR, they are run under identical mobility and traffic scenarios. A basic version of AODV and DSR is used without optimizations.
Three performance metrics are evaluated here, as follows: (1) Reconstructive time for acquiring S K: The reconstructive time represents the average delay time between the sending of a CSRREQ packet by a source to discover k cluster heads and the receipt of the k corresponding CSRREPs (sharing keys) reply. If a CSRREQ times out and requires retransmission, the sending time of the initial transmission was used to calculate the reconstruction. (2) Packet delivery ratio: The packet delivery ratio is the ratio of the number of CSRREQ packets actually delivered to the destination cluster head versus the number of CSRREQ packets transmitted by the source cluster head. This ratio evaluates the ability of the protocol to discover routes. (3) Routing overheads: This is the ratio of the routing packets to total delivered data packets. The transmission at each hop along the route was considered one transmission in the calculation of this metric [11] . CSBRP is exempt from larger control overhead due to certificates and signatures which are stored in packets; moreover, CSBRP has a smaller hop-count than other routing protocols. Figure 17 shows the observed results for increasing mobile nodes and describes the delay time involved in reconstructing the S K from the k cluster heads. Each data point is generated from an average of 15 simulations conducted with identical configuration but different randomly generated mobility patterns. Clearly, the cluster-based routing protocol is more effective in large-scale ad hoc networks than are the AODV [23] , [29] and DSR [15] protocols.
As shown in Fig. 18 , the packet delivery rate using CS-BRP in mobile situations exceeds 0.95 for 50 node networks. This finding suggests that CSBRP is highly effective in discovering and maintaining routes for packet delivery, even given relatively high node mobility. Despite the mobile nodes increasing, the CSBRP is less influential than DSR and AODV as shown in Fig. 19 . Figure 20 shows the routing overhead measurements. While the number of security bytes transmitted is roughly equivalent for all protocols, CSBRP transmits fewer routing packets than does DSR. Moreover, the routing load of CS-BRP is significantly lower than that of DSR following 100 node networks.
Conclusions
This study has proposed a novel cluster-organized key management scheme and integrated the key management into secure routing mechanisms. The proposed approach provides a resilient and scalable method that distributes the key to threshold cluster heads to prevent a single failure point of CA and makes the approach more robust to malicious behaviors. Additionally, by defining a generic and flexible framework for describing a self-organized and MOCA [6] structure, the approach becomes extremely suitable for scalable ad hoc networks. Besides, this study introduces a method of cluster security known as CSBRP into routing protocols using pre-determined cryptographic certificates to effectively provide cluster-to-cluster authentication and nonrepudiation secure routing in a managed-open environment. Furthermore, this study also demonstrates that the proposed model is superior to the node-based model in RSA secure computation evaluation and hop count communication evaluation. Finally, NS-2 is used to simulate the updated convergence time of sharing keys, the packet delivery ratio, and routing overheads. The simulation results demonstrate that CSBRP is more effective than the secure mechanisms in conjunction with DSR or AODV routing protocols.
